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ABSTRACT 
Substantial evidence indicates that incentive value depends on an anticipation of rewards 
within a given context. However, the computations underlying this context sensitivity 
remain unknown. To address this question we introduce a normative (Bayesian) account of 
how rewards map to incentive values. This assumes that the brain inverts a model of how 
rewards are generated. Key features of our account include (i) an influence of prior beliefs 
about the context in which rewards are delivered (weighted by their reliability in a Bayes-
optimal fashion), (ii) the notion that incentive values correspond to precision-weighted 
prediction errors, (iii) and contextual information unfolding at different hierarchical levels. 
This formulation implies that incentive value is intrinsically context-dependent. We provide 
empirical support for this model by showing that incentive value is influenced by context 
variability and by hierarchically nested contexts. The perspective we introduce generates 
new empirical predictions that might help explaining psychopathologies, such as addiction. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Choice preferences vary as a function of context, and recent studies have shed light on the 
processes underlying these contextual influences (Huber et al., 1982; Johnson & Busemeyer, 
2005; Ludvig et al., 2013; Louie et al., 2013; 2014; 2015; Roe et al., 2011; Rigoli et al., 2016a; 
2016b; Simonson & Tversky, 1992; Soltani et al., 2012; Stewart, 2009; Stewart et al., 2003; 
Summerfield & Tsetsos, 2012; 2015; Tsetsos et al., 2010; 2012; 2016; Tversky, 1972; Usher & 
McClelland, 2004; Vlaev et al., 2012). For example, in (Rigoli et al., 2016a; 2016b) 
participants performed a task where blocks of trials were associated with either a low or a 
high-value context (with overlapping distributions). Choice behaviour was consistent with 
the hypothesis that the incentive values of identical rewards were larger in the low 
compared to the high-value context. This and similar evidence suggests that, at least in 
some cases, contextual effects on choice behaviour are explained by an incentive value that 
reflects the relative value of rewards anticipated within a given context (Louie et al., 2013; 
Ludvig et al., 2013; Rigoli et al., 2016a; Stewart, 2009; Stewart et al., 2003).  
However, the computational mechanisms underlying the context sensitive nature of 
incentive value remain unclear. A promising explanatory framework builds on the notion 
that the brain’s computations correspond to Bayesian inference and learning. Several 
empirical and theoretical arguments support Bayesian inference as a general account of 
brain function (Chater et al., 2006; Clark, 2013; Dayan et al., 1995; Ernst, 2006; Friston, 
2010). The application of similar principles to value learning and planning has inspired the 
notions of planning as inference and active inference (Botvinick & Toussaint, 2012; Friston 
et al., 2013; 2015; Pezzulo & Rigoli, 2011; Pezzulo et al., 2015; Solway & Botvinick, 2012). 
Here, we consider the possibility that context-sensitive value is a product of Bayesian 
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inference. This implies that incentive value will depend on expectation and uncertainty 
about rewards, conditioned upon contextual factors. If this is the case, we would expect to 
see choice behaviour change with any contextual variable that is an ancestor of rewards in 
the subject’s generative model of these rewards.  
We refer to our account as a Bayesian model of context-sensitive value (BCV). Below, we 
introduce the model and compare it with previous accounts of contextual influence on 
incentive value and choice (Bushong et al., 2014; Kőszegi & Rabin, 2006; Kőszegi, & Szeidl, 
2014; Louie et al., 2014; 2015). We then report data from two behavioural experiments 
where we analysed two key predictions of BCV. 
 
RESULTS 
Bayesian account of context-sensitive value 
The general framework of BCV is Bayesian, building on a proposal that the brain performs 
some form of Bayesian inference (Chater et al., 2006; Clark, 2013; Dayan et al., 1995; Ernst, 
2006; Friston, 2010). This approach considers the brain to possess a generative model of the 
sensorium, comprising a set of random variables (i.e., hidden states or causes of sensory 
outcomes) and their causal links (i.e., probabilistic contingencies). The variables can be 
separated into hidden and observable variables; the former representing the latent causes 
of observations, and the latter representing sensory evidence or cues. Sensory evidence is 
conveyed by observable variables, and this evidence is combined with prior beliefs to 
produce a posterior belief about the (hidden) causes of observations. The application of this 
logic to perception is straightforward and has proved effective in explaining several 
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empirical phenomena in perception (Chater et al., 2006; Clark, 2013; Dayan et al., 1995; 
Ernst, 2006; Friston, 2010). For instance, there is evidence for integrating different 
perceptual modalities (e.g., visual and tactile) in a manner consistent with Bayesian 
principles (Ernst, 2006).  
We propose a Bayesian scheme for BCV that accommodates the influence of context on 
incentive value. BCV focuses on scenarios (i) where incentive value depends on contextual 
information (either represented by cues or by previous rewards) provided before options or 
rewards are presented, and (ii) where reward is defined by a single attribute (e.g., reward 
amount). To describe the basic principles of BCV, we adopt the formalism of Bayesian 
graphs (Bishop, 2006) where a generative model is described by nodes or circles, 
representing random variables (shaded and white circles refer to observed and non-
observed variables respectively), and arrows, representing causal relationships among 
variables. A simple generative model hypothesized by BCV is shown in Figure 1A, where C 
represents prior beliefs about the average reward expected in a given context. Formally, this 
corresponds to a (Gaussian) prior belief (with mean and variance  over the mean of a 
(Gaussian) distribution of reward options R (with variance ). When R is observed, a 
posterior expectation about the context is obtained by application of Bayes rule (Bishop, 
2006): 
 
 
 
(1) 
The crucial proposal we advance here is that the incentive value V(R) attributed to a certain 
reward option is embedded within this belief update process and corresponds to a 
precision-weighted prediction error (Friston, 2005); namely, to the difference between R 
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and the expected reward μC, multiplied by a gain term, which depends on the variances of 
both reward and context (i.e., relative confidence or precision): 
 
 
(2) 
 
The notion that incentive value corresponds to precision-weighted prediction error links 
with ideas in other cognitive domains proposing that prior expectations are explained away 
and perception corresponds to (precision-weighted) residuals, or prediction errors 
(Blakemore et al., 1999; Brown et al., 2013; Friston, 2005; Rao & Ballard, 1999). For 
example, it has been proposed that our sense of agency emerges from explaining away 
action-dependent somatosensory predictions, and hence what is perceived as externally 
generated sensation corresponds to (precision-weighted) residuals of the sensory input 
(Brown et al., 2013).  
Here, we propose that a similar mechanism is involved in attribution of incentive value. This 
implies two fundamental forms of contextual normalization. First, a subtractive 
normalization is exerted when  is different from zero. For example, if we assign positive 
and negative numbers to rewards and punishments respectively, their corresponding 
incentive values may change in sign, depending on whether punishment (i.e., or 
reward (i.e.,  is expected on average within the context. This implies that small 
rewards can appear as losses in contexts where large rewards are expected. Second, a 
divisive normalization depends on the gain . This implies that the positive and negative 
value of profits (i.e.,  and losses (i.e.,  will be augmented or attenuated, 
7 
 
depending upon the relative precision of prior beliefs about (prior confidence in) the 
context ( and of sensory evidence about the reward option ( . 
Equation two applies every time novel information about reward is provided, which is when 
a prediction error occurs. This happens (i) when a (primary or secondary) reward is 
delivered (or is not delivered when expected), which can be post choice as well as in other 
conditions (e.g., in classical conditioning paradigms, when a reward is delivered 
independent of action), and (ii) when one (or more) option is presented. The latter follows 
because an agent has an expectation about an option, which leads to a prediction error 
when the actual option is presented. 
A key aspect of our proposal addresses how contextual variables are implemented within a 
generative model. One possibility, illustrated in Figure 1B, is a generative model that 
includes an observation O reporting information about context. This model assumes that a 
value C is drawn from a Gaussian distribution with mean  and variance . A zero 
mean captures context-independent information, as it implies that overall rewards 
(i.e.,   and punishments (i.e.,  will be attributed positive and negative 
incentive values respectively. The variance reflects prior uncertainty about the hidden or 
latent context. A context observation O is sampled from a Gaussian distribution with mean 
f(C) and variance  (reflecting the reliability of the context-related cue). For simplicity, we 
assume that f(C) = C, though in general this can be any function (similar simplifications are 
assumed below). A reward R is observed after being sampled from a Gaussian distribution 
with mean C and variance   (reflecting uncertainty about the reward distribution).  
We propose that agents form posterior beliefs about the context P(C|O,R) using Bayesian 
belief updating – first accumulating contextual information by estimating P(C|O), and then 
8 
 
reward information to give P(C|O,R). This sequential inference (c.f., evidence accumulation) 
is motivated by the fact that information about context is usually provided at an earlier time 
point than reward options. The mean of the posterior distribution P(C|O) is: 
 
 
 
(3) 
And the posterior variance: 
 
 
 
(4) 
The mean of the posterior distribution P(C|O,R) corresponds to: 
 
 
 
(5) 
Implying the following incentive value for reward: 
 
 
 
(6) 
This shows that, other things being equal, information about the context (reflected in the 
value of O) induces a subtractive value normalization. 
A possible extension of this generative model is illustrated in Figure 1C where contexts are 
organized hierarchically (Pezzulo et al., 2015). Imagine evaluating the same dish in different 
restaurants (a low-level context) and in different neighbourhoods (a high-level context). This 
example highlights the fact that some (high-level) contexts are more generic, while other 
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(low-level) contexts are more specific. Crucially, if a context exerted no impact on incentive 
value, one would expect that the dish would be equally attractive, irrespective of where it 
was experienced. If one context exerted an influence, we would expect, for example, that 
the incentive value of the dish depends on the restaurant and not on the neighbourhood. 
Finally, if both contextual levels are in play, one would predict that different incentive values 
would be attributed to the same dish as a function of both the restaurant and 
neighbourhood. Here, we examined the possibility that incentive value depends on 
generative models where contexts are nested hierarchically. A higher-level contextual 
variable (e.g., the neighbourhood) is represented by a Gaussian distribution with mean  
equal to zero and variance , from which a value HC is sampled. Sensory evidence about 
HC is provided by HO, which is sampled from a Gaussian distribution with mean HC and 
variance  . A lower-level contextual variable (e.g., the restaurant) is represented by a 
(Gaussian) distribution with mean HC and variance , from which a value LC is sampled. 
Sensory evidence about LC is provided and represented by LO which is sampled from a 
Gaussian distribution with mean LC and variance  A reward option is obtained and 
sampled from a Gaussian distribution with mean LC and variance . We propose that 
agents infer the posterior distribution P(LC|HO,LO,R) sequentially by estimating, in the 
order, P(HC|HO), P(LC|HO), P(LC|HO,LO), and P(LC|HO,LO,R). This produces an equation for 
incentive value with the following form (see Appendix for derivation): 
  
 
(7) 
Three normalization effects are implicit here. The first ( ) is a subtractive normalization 
proportional to the value LO observed at the low contextual level. A second one ( ) is 
a subtractive normalization proportional to the value HO observed at the high contextual 
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level. The terms τ represent precision-dependent weights and describe the relative precision 
of the low-level ( ) and high-level (  cues. Finally, a third factor (K) implements divisive 
normalization and depends on a gain term which includes reward variance (see Appendix).  
In summary, this Bayesian formulation outlines a principled theoretical explanation for how 
we contextualise rewards based on prior expectation and uncertainty with potential deep 
hierarchical structure. The key role of uncertainty is reflected in the precision-weighting of 
prediction errors (e.g., outcome or reward prediction errors).  
The proposal advanced here has some similarities with classical theories of value, such as 
Expected Utility theory (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944) and Prospect theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). For example, there are convergences between the influence 
of average reward in BCV and the impact of wealth on marginal utility as postulated in 
Expected Utility theory. Similarities exist also between the role of average reward in BCV 
and the status quo notion in Prospect theory, which distinguishes between loss and profit. 
Indeed in BCV profits can be conceived in terms of values larger than the expected reward 
and losses as values smaller than the expected reward.  
We see a more direct link between BCV and recent economic models which postulate that 
incentive value is adapted to the statistics of the expected reward distribution (Bushong et 
al., 2014; Kőszegi & Rabin, 2006; Kőszegi, B., & Szeidl, 2014), which in turn depends on prior 
experience within an environment (Stewart et al., 2006; Stewart, 2009). These theories can 
be broadly classified into those based on subtractive normalization, which assume that 
incentive value corresponds to the reward minus a reference value (Kőszegi & Rabin, 2006), 
and those based on divisive normalization, prescribing that incentive value corresponds to 
the reward divided (or multiplied; Kőszegi & Szeidl, 2014) by either the expected reward 
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(Louie et al., 2014; 2015) or the range of an expected distribution of rewards (Bushong et 
al., 2014; Kőszegi & Szeidl, 2014). 
BCV differs in important ways from previous theories in its attempt to derive contextual 
normalization from normative assumptions of Bayesian statistics. This approach conceives 
incentive value as precision-weighted prediction error and implies two forms of contextual 
adaptation (Figure 2). First, as in some previous theories (Kőszegi & Rabin, 2006), 
subtractive normalization emerges as the expected reward is subtracted from the actual 
reward. Second, the gain term implements divisive normalization, an aspect similar to a 
recent model in which the range of the reward distribution (which is analogous – though not 
identical - to the gain term) divides the reward (Bushong et al., 2014). Importantly these 
predictions are specific and distinguish BCV from other models. For instance, BCV predicts 
that divisive normalization derives from the gain term (i.e., reward variance) and not from 
the expected reward (Louie et al., 2014; 2015), and that the reward variance divides – and 
not multiplies (Kőszegi & Szeidl, 2014) – the prediction error. Importantly, these predictions 
are not ad hoc but derive necessarily from Bayesian assumptions. 
 
Experiment one 
Data from conditions where BCV is applicable, namely those involving a single attribute and 
where context depends on past options (and not simultaneously presented options), are 
relatively scarce. Here, empirical evidence has shown a subtractive normalization, whereby 
incentive values are rescaled to the expected reward (Kőszegi & Rabin, 2006; Ludvig et al., 
2013; Rigoli et al., 2016a; 2016b). In addition, there is absence of evidence for a divisive 
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normalization exerted by the expected reward (i.e., where values are divided by the 
expected reward; Rigoli et al., 2016a; 2016b). Both findings are consistent with BCV. 
However, another key prediction of BCV relies on a divisive normalization dependent on 
reward variance (Figure 2 B-C), though it remains unknown whether such variance-
dependent normalization actually occurs. Here, we present data from a behavioural 
experiment where we investigate this very question. 
Participants performed a computer-based decision-making task (Figure 3) in which a 
monetary amount, changing trial by trial, was presented in the centre of the screen and 
participants had to choose whether to accept half of it for sure or select a 50-50 gamble 
between the full monetary amount and zero, a scenario where the sure option and gamble 
always carry the same expected value (EV). The task was organized in blocks, each 
associated with one of two contexts which determined the possible EVs associated with the 
block. These EVs were £3 and £4 for the low-variance context, and £2, £3, £4 and £5 for the 
high-variance context. Note that average choice EV was equal across contexts (i.e., £3.5). 
Contexts were cued by the associated EVs displayed on the top of the screen in brackets. To 
ensure incentive compatibility, at the end of the experiment one single outcome was 
randomly selected and paid out to participants.  
In the analyses we focused on choices common to both contexts, namely involving £3 and 
£4 EV. P < 0.05 was used as significance criterion and trials with reaction times slower than 3 
seconds (and faster than 400ms) excluded. For these choices, average gambling probability 
did not differ from 50% (mean = 49; SD = 23; t(35) = -0.31, p < 0.76). In addition, gambling 
probability was equivalent when comparing £4 and £3 choices (t(35) = -0.81, p = 0.43). 
Across individuals, there was no correlation between the average gambling probability for 
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£4 and £3 and the difference in gambling probability between these two EVs (Figure 4 C-D; 
r(36) = -0.06, p = 0.75). The latter result replicates previous findings (Rigoli et al., 2016a; 
2016b) and supports the idea of a differentiation between an average gambling propensity 
and a preference to gamble with large or small EV as determinant of risk choice.  
We investigated key predictions of BCV regarding a divisive normalization (or precision 
weighting) effect exerted by context, which is captured by the gain term  in equation 
2. We can formalize our context manipulation by varying the reward variance , which is 
larger in the high-variance context, implying a smaller gain term. Given that £4 and £3 are 
larger and smaller than the context average (i.e., £3.5) respectively, we predicted that (at 
option presentation) they induce a positive and negative prediction error respectively. 
Because of the gain term, BCV predicts (Figure 2 C-D) that £4 is attributed a larger (i.e., more 
positive) incentive value in the low-variance context while £3 is attributed larger (i.e., less 
negative) incentive value in the high-variance context.  Note that in our task there are two 
types of variance. The first refers to the variance of possible outcomes of the gamble (which 
is perfectly correlated with the EV of options, as in Rigoli et al., 2016), and is not the focus of 
our study. The second refers to variance across options (i.e., the variance characterizing the 
distribution of successive options), which is what we experimentally manipulate and 
investigate. In the model, this is reflected in  and affects the gain term in equation 2.  
First, we tested our central predictions by analysing raw choice data. Though we observed 
no overall difference in gambling across participants for £4 and £3 EV (see above), 
participants could be differentiated based on those who gambled more with £4 or £3 EV. In 
line with previous observations (Rigoli et al., 2016a; 2016b), we predicted that the impact of 
context on gambling depended on a subject-specific propensity to gamble more with large 
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or small choice EVs; in other words on whether a participant prefers to gamble for £3 
compared to £4 EV or vice versa. Combining this prediction with BCV predictions (Figure 2 C-
D), participants who risked more with increasing EVs would be expected to gamble more for 
£4 and less for £3 in the low-variance context (when £4 and £3 would be attributed larger 
and smaller incentive value respectively) compared to the high-variance context. On the 
contrary, participants who risked more with decreasing EVs would be expected to gamble 
less for £4 and more for £3 in the low-variance context compared to the high-variance 
context. To examine these predictions we tested for an interaction, corresponding to the 
differential gambling percentage across contexts (low-variance minus high-variance context) 
for £4 choices minus the differential gambling percentage across contexts (low-variance 
minus high-variance context) for £3 choices. Across participants, the interaction term did 
not differ from zero (t(35) = -0.43, p = 0.67) but, consistent with our hypothesis, it showed a 
significant correlation with the gambling probability for £4 minus £3 choices (Figure 4 A-B-E-
F; r(36) =  0.45, p = 0.005). Note that this result remains significant when using a Spearman 
correlation, which is less affected by outliers (rho = 0.51, p = 0.002). 
Next, we adopted a model-based approach to assess whether BCV explains choice data. 
Following equation 2, if the option EV is R, then its associated incentive value will be: 
 
  
 
(8) 
Where  is an indicator of the high (  = 1) or low-variance context (  = 0),  indicates the 
contextual mean (and is equal to £3.5 for both contexts), and  is a free parameter 
(bounded within the 0.1-10 range) which implements a gain term and captures divisive 
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normalization of reward. To connect value adaptation to choice, we used a logistic 
regression model of gambling where the probability of choosing the gamble does not 
depend on the objective option EV, but on the associated incentive value  (i.e., 
transformed by contextual normalization): 
 
 
 
(9) 
Where α is a value-related parameter which determines whether gambling increases (α > 0) 
or decreases (α < 0) with larger incentive value  and ρ represents a gambling bias 
parameter.  
We used likelihood ratio tests (see Materials and methods) to compare this model with 
simpler (i.e., reduced) models, where one or more parameters were set to zero. Model 
comparison favoured the full model (comparison with: random model: (108) = 3268, p < 
0.001; model with α: (72) = 2502, p < 0.001; model with ρ: (72) = 1526, p < 0.001; model 
with α and ρ: (36) = 704, p < 0.001). In addition, the model predicts that the free 
parameter τ is smaller than one or log(τ) is less than zero. Consistent with BCV and variance-
dependent normalization, the mean of log(τ) was significantly smaller than zero (t(35) = -
2.81, p = 0.008). 
We next compared the full model with an alternative model without a subtractive 
normalization component (as postulated by BCV, where the expected reward is subtracted 
to the actual reward); namely, where the incentive value was equal to . The 
latter model derives from previous accounts of context-sensitive value (Bushong et al., 
2014; Kőszegi, & Szeidl, 2014). We compared the negative log-likelihood of the two models 
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(given that they had an equal number of free parameters) and found a smaller score for the 
model with the subtractive component (difference in log-likelihood: 254). We tested this 
difference by performing a Chi-square test with one degree of freedom (treating the model 
predicted by BCV as having an additional parameter). This test was significant ( (1) = 508, p 
< 0.001), meaning that the model implementing both subtractive and divisive normalization 
(derived from BCV and described by equation 8) fits the data better. 
Finally, we used the (selected) model and subject-specific parameter estimates of the last 
analysis to generate simulated choice behaviour and performed behavioural analyses on the 
ensuing data (data were simulated 100 times and the average statistics are reported). 
Consistent with real data, the full model replicated the lack of correlation between average 
gambling (for £4 and £3 choices) and the difference in gambling for £4 and £3 choices 
(average r(36) = -0.06, p =0.73), while a correlation emerged when data were simulated 
using a model without the gambling bias parameter ρ (average r(36) = 0.51, p = 0.001). 
Moreover, and again consistent with empirical data, the full model replicated the 
correlation between gambling for £4 minus £3 choices and the context-EV interaction effect 
term (average r(36) = 0.48, p = 0.003), a result not obtained when data were simulated using 
a model without the value-function parameter α (average r(36) = 0.01, p = 0.95) or without 
the context parameter τ (average r(36) = 0.09, p = 0.60).  
Collectively, these analyses validate the proposal of a divisive normalization component 
dependent on a gain term (in turn dependent on reward variance) consistent with BCV. 
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Experiment two 
Another key prediction of BCV is that the generative model can reflect contexts organized 
hierarchically and that incentive value and choice are adapted to contextual information 
available at different hierarchical levels (Figure 2 E-F). So far, there has been a focus on non-
hierarchical settings (Kőszegi & Rabin, 2006; Ludvig et al., 2013; Rigoli et al., 2016a; 2016b), 
and therefore whether adaptation combines influence from context at multiple hierarchical 
levels remains unknown. Here, we present data from a behavioural experiment where we 
investigated this question. 
Participants played a computer-based task (Figure 5) where, on each trial, two rectangles 
representing two decks of cards appeared. Each card was associated with a monetary 
reward, and the average card reward for each deck was displayed in brackets on the deck. 
The decks were coloured; one in grey and the other in blue. A card was pseudo-randomly 
drawn from the blue deck and the corresponding monetary reward was presented in the 
middle of the screen. Participants had to choose between half of the monetary reward for 
sure and a gamble between the full reward and a zero outcome, each with 50% chance. 
Note that, as in experiment one, the two options carry the same EV. After making a choice, 
the outcome was then shown. To ensure incentive compatibility, at the end of the 
experiment, one outcome was randomly selected and paid out to participants.  
The deck selected by the computer alternated pseudo-randomly over blocks. In addition, 
two sets of decks alternated over longer blocks in a pseudo-random way. The first deck-set 
(low-value deck-set) comprised decks associated with an average of £5 and £7, the second 
(high-value deck-set) comprised decks associated with an average of £7 and £9. The cards of 
the £5 deck were associated with £3, £5 and £7; the cards of the £7 deck were associated 
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with £5, £7 and £9; the cards of the £9 deck were associated with £7, £9 and £11. The aim 
of this experimental paradigm was to manipulate context at two hierarchical levels, a low-
level associated with decks, and a high-level associated with deck-sets. Note that the 
rewards overlapped between contexts at both levels; namely, across decks and deck-sets. In 
relation to decks, £5 and £7 cards were common to both decks in the low-value deck-set, 
and £7 and £9 cards were common to both decks in the high-value deck-set. If this level of 
context exerted an influence, it should elicit changes in choice consistent with BCV when 
comparing choices based upon the same reward across decks. In relation to deck-sets, the 
deck associated with £7 average was present in both sets. If the deck-set level exerted an 
influence, this would elicit changes in choice consistent with context sensitive value during 
presentation of the £7 deck. 
The average gambling percentage did not differ from fifty percent across subjects (mean = 
54; SD = 16; t(31) = 1.48, p = 0.12). P < 0.05 was used as significance criterion and trials with 
reaction times slower than 3 seconds (and faster than 400ms) excluded. We assessed the 
impact of option EV on choice using a logistic regression model, where EV was included as 
regressor. The associated regression coefficient was not significantly different from zero 
across participants (Figure 4; t(31) = -1.67, p = 0.11). We then investigated the relationship 
between the average propensity to gamble and the effect of EV on gambling but did not find 
any correlation (Figure 7A; r(32) = 0.23, p = 0.21). This result again replicates previous 
studies using a similar paradigm (Rigoli et al., 2016a; 2016b), and highlights two different 
determinants of risk attitude; one linked with a baseline gambling propensity and the other 
linked with a preference to gamble with large or small reward amounts. 
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Though across participants we observed no overall effect of option EV on gambling, 
participants could be differentiated based on those who showed a positive or negative 
effect of option EV on gambling. Based on previous findings (Rigoli et al., 2016a; 2016b), we 
hypothesized that context sensitive value would predispose participants who preferred to 
gamble for large EVs to gamble more when EVs were larger relative to contextual 
expectations, namely in lower value contexts (Figure 6). Similarly, we expected participants 
who preferred to gamble for small EVs to gamble more when EVs were smaller relative to 
contextual expectations, namely, in higher value contexts. We investigated this hypothesis 
both at the level of decks and deck-sets (Figure 6).  
At the level of decks, we computed – for each deck-set – the difference in gambling 
between lower and higher value decks for rewards common to both decks (corresponding 
to £5 and £7 in the low-value deck-set, and to £7 and £9 in the high-value deck-set). The 
mean of these two differences correlated across subjects with the effect of EV on gambling 
(i.e., the associated regression coefficient of the logistic regression model; Figure 7C; r(32) = 
0.55, p = 0.001), consistent with a contextualisation of reward by decks at the lower 
contextual level. At the level of deck-sets, we computed the difference in gambling between 
the low and high value deck-set for the £7 deck (common to both deck-sets). This difference 
correlated across subjects with the effect of EV on gambling (i.e., the associated regression 
coefficient of the logistic regression model; Figure 7E; r(32) = 0.42, p = 0.018), consistent 
with a context sensitive value effect of the higher contextual level. 
We next investigated whether BCV explains the context effects implicit in these results. 
Since, in our task, contexts are organized hierarchically (i.e., decks and deck-sets are 
associated with high and low levels – in the sense that the set determines the possible 
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decks), we refer to the generative model shown in Figure 1C, where incentive value is 
described by equation 7. Recall that there are three normalization terms under this model 
(see equation 7):  first a subtractive term ( ) proportional to the value LO observed at 
the low contextual level, second a subtractive term ( ) proportional to the value HO 
observed at the high contextual level, and third a divisive factor (K) dependent on precision. 
In our task, the average contextual reward was manipulated, enabling us to examine the 
subtractive terms outlined in equation 7. We did this by treating the contextual averages as 
observations of the true underlying contexts of the task (in equation 7, HO and LO would be 
associated with deck-set and deck respectively). However, since reward variance (which 
enters the divisive normalization factor K) was not manipulated, this task is not suitable to 
quantify an effect of precision-weighting – and therefore we omitted this factor from the 
model of our empirical data. Specifically, based on equation 7 and omitting K, if the option 
EV is R, then its associated incentive value will be: 
 
 
 
(10) 
Where  indicates the average option EV for the deck (for £9 deck: for £7 
deck: ; for £5 deck: ),  indicates the average option EV for the deck-
set (high-value deck-set: ; low-value deck-set:  is a free parameter 
that mediates contextual effects at the deck level, and  is a free parameter that 
mediates contextual effects at the deck-set level (see Materials and methods).  
To connect value adaptation to choice, we used a logistic regression model as in equation 9 
where α is a value-related parameter which determines whether gambling increases (α > 0) 
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or decreases (α < 0) with larger incentive value  and ρ represents a gambling bias 
parameter. We used a likelihood ratio test to compare this model with simpler (reduced) 
models where one or more parameters were set to zero. The full model was favoured 
(comparison with: random model: (128) = 2959, p < 0.001; model with α: (96) = 1530, p 
< 0.001; model with ρ: (96) = 1622, p < 0.001; model with α and ρ: (64) = 262, p < 0.001; 
model with α, ρ and : (32) = 134, p < 0.001; model with α, ρ and : (32) = 58, p < 
0.001). In addition, consistent with context sensitivity at both hierarchical levels, the 
context-related free parameters of the full model were significantly larger than zero (Figure 
6;   t(31) = 4.55, p < 0.001;  t(31) =2.67, p =0.012). 
We next compared the full model with an alternative model where the context parameters 
(capturing the influence of the reward expected within a context at multiple hierarchical 
levels) divided the reward rather than being subtracted from the reward; in other words 
where the incentive value corresponds to: 
 
 
 
(11) 
The latter model derives from previous accounts of context sensitivity (Louie et al., 2014; 
2015). We compared the negative log-likelihood of the two models (given they had an equal 
number of free parameters) and found a smaller score for the model with subtractive 
normalization (difference in log-likelihood for divisive minus subtractive model; full models: 
39; for models with α, ρ and : 13; for models with α, ρ and : 25). This difference was 
tested statistically by performing a Chi-square test with one degree of freedom (treating the 
model predicted by BCV as having an additional parameter). This test was significant (full 
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models: (1) = 78, p < 0.001; for models with α, ρ and : (1) = 26, p < 0.001; for models 
with α, ρ and : (1) = 50, p < 0.001), meaning that the model implementing subtractive 
normalization (consistent with BCV) is a better explanation for the data. 
Finally, we used the (selected) model and subject-specific parameter estimates of the last 
analysis to generate simulated choice behaviour and performed behavioural analyses on the 
ensuing data (data were simulated 100 times and the average statistics are reported). As 
with real data, our modelling replicated the absence of correlation between average 
gambling and the effect of reward on gambling (i.e., the slope of the logistic regression; see 
above) (Figure 7B; average r(32) = 0.06, p =0.76), while a correlation emerged when the 
data were simulated using a model without the gambling bias parameter ρ (average r(32) = 
0.85, p < 0.001). Moreover, consistent with empirical data, the full model replicated the 
correlation between (i) the effect of EV on gambling and the difference in gambling across 
decks for choices common to both decks of a deck-set (combining both deck-sets; Figure 7D; 
average r(32) = 0.58, p < 0.001), (ii) the effect of EV on gambling and the difference across 
deck-sets in gambling for the £7 deck (common to both deck-sets; Figure 7F; average 
r(32)=0.57, p = 0.001). These correlations were not replicated when data were simulated 
using a model without the value-related parameter α (first correlation: average r(32) = 0.09, 
p = 0.62; second correlation: average r(32) = =0.02, p = 0.89). Furthermore, the first 
correlation was not replicated when using a model without the parameter  (average 
r(32) = -0.15, p = 0.41) and the second correlation was not obtained when using a model 
without the parameter (average r(32) = -0.03, p = 0.87).  
Collectively, these analyses show subtractive normalization exerted by contextual effects at 
multiple hierarchical levels consistent with predictions from BCV. 
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DISCUSSION 
We propose a Bayesian scheme (BCV) as a model of contextual influences on incentive value 
attribution. BCV is based on Bayesian inference principles and on generative models of 
reward. Adopting two novel experimental designs, we provide behavioural evidence that 
supports two key predictions of BCV, namely that value attribution is affected by reward 
variance (which exerts divisive normalization) and by hierarchically organized contexts. 
Our account is motivated by normative principles of Bayesian statistics – and fits within a 
Bayesian brain hypothesis framework (Chater et al., 2006; Clark, 2013; Dayan et al., 1995; 
Ernst, 2006; Friston, 2010). As such, it provides a principled account of decision making 
under uncertainty. In particular, it accommodates expectation and uncertainty that may 
have deep hierarchical structure, as in real world situations. Bayesian schemes are based on 
a formal and clear definition of the imperatives that motivate cognitive processes, which are 
conceived in terms of inference. This allows BCV to establish a link with Bayesian 
perspectives in other domains of cognitive neuroscience, helping unifying perspectives on 
brain functioning.  
Our proposal is closely linked to the framework of planning as inference and active 
inference (Botvinick & Toussaint, 2012; Friston et al., 2013; 2015; Pezzulo & Rigoli, 2011; 
Pezzulo et al., 2015; Solway & Botvinick, 2012). This recasts decision-making and planning – 
usually understood in terms of value or utility maximization – as a form Bayesian inference, 
and hence can provide a unifying inferential account of perception and action. Hierarchical 
implementations of active inference schemes have been proposed previously, and the 
notion of hierarchically-organized contexts fits comfortably within these schemes (Pezzulo 
et al., 2015). BCV extends this framework by focusing on the determinants of incentive 
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value, conceived as precision-weighted prediction error based on (potentially hierarchical) 
contextual expectations.  
BCV postulates that the two fundamental determinants of incentive value are prediction 
error and precision. A prediction error is determined by the difference between the 
observed and expected reward which, in BCV, derives from integrating different 
expectations under contextual uncertainty. Gain depends on (relative) precision or 
confidence – and ensures that the prediction error is normalised and (Bayes) optimally 
weighted in relation to uncertainty about both context and reward. In brief, only precise 
prediction errors have an effect on expectations higher in the hierarchy during Bayesian 
belief updating. BCV predicts that precision exerts an influence in two ways. First, at high 
hierarchical levels, precision determines the optimal integration of multiple contextual 
representations – as it mandates that contexts characterized by a high precision (greater 
reliability) exert more influence on reward expectancy. For instance, if we assume that 
subjects have very precise beliefs about the low-level context (e.g., the deck), then the 
effect of the high-level (e.g., the deck set) will disappear. Formally, this is because in the 
hierarchical model the low-level context constitutes a Markov blanket for the posterior 
expectation about the reward option (Bishop, 2006). In other words, the effect of the high-
level context tells us that if subjects are using a hierarchical model, there must be posterior 
uncertainty about the low-level context. Heuristically, even though they can see which deck 
they are currently playing with, they still nuance their expectations about this deck based 
upon the deck-set from which it came. Second, at the lowest hierarchical level, precision 
determines the gain assigned to the prediction error and hence is a direct determinant of 
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incentive value. In our first experiment we show evidence consistent with the latter 
expression of precision. 
The central role attributed to precision-weighted prediction error is consistent with 
Bayesian models in other domains, and speaks to the idea of common computational 
principles in the brain. In fact, one central idea of many influential Bayesian proposals is 
that, when sensory inputs are presented, predictions are explained away and the resulting 
perception corresponds to (precision-weighted) prediction errors. For instance, predictive 
coding models are based on evidence that activity in certain brain regions responsible for 
perception reflects prediction errors and not raw sensory inputs (Friston, 2005; Rao & 
Ballard, 1999). Moreover, it has been proposed that our sense of agency depends on 
explaining away somatosensory predictions associated with motor commands, with 
unexplained sensations alone (i.e., residuals) attributed to external forces (Brown et al., 
2013). A similar view characterizes active inference schemes, which assume that action is 
not steered by stimuli per se but by the (precision-weighted) prediction error elicited by 
those stimuli, expressing the extent to which they depart from expectation in a meaningful 
way (Friston et al., 2013; 2015).  
Within BCV contextual representations can be hierarchically organized, with high levels 
characterized by more general conditions. Because reward options are descendants of all 
hierarchical levels, any context can exert an influence on incentive value, insofar as these 
levels determine the reward expected in a certain condition. Specifically, BCV can integrate 
– in a Bayes optimal way – context-independent beliefs about the reward distribution with 
context-sensitive beliefs unfolding at multiple hierarchical levels. The possibility that 
subjects use hierarchical generative models is in fact supported by our empirical findings. 
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Our results are consistent with the idea that rewards have larger incentive values when both 
high and low-level contexts are characterized by reward distributions with a smaller 
average. This indicates that information about more specific (e.g., the deck) and more 
general (e.g., the deck-set) contexts are integrated to determine incentive values and choice 
behaviour.  
A hierarchical nesting might explain why contextual effects observed in psychological 
experiments are usually substantial but not extreme. In other words, it is unlikely that 10p 
will be attributed the same value as $100, even when the contextual manipulation may 
appear to induce an equivalence between the two quantities. This can be explained by 
contextual effects from the highest hierarchical level (e.g., that reward options have, in 
general, a prior expectation of zero). This supraordinate level can be conceived as 
representing a context-independent distribution of rewards that may derive from the 
overall statistics of our environment (Stewart et al., 2006; 2009) and/or from innate prior 
beliefs about the distribution of incentives (Rigoli et al., 2016c; 2016d).  
The proposal that incentive value corresponds to (precision-weighted) reward prediction 
error should not be confounded with the idea that it corresponds to posterior reward 
expectation. Though both possibilities derive from Bayesian principles, they make opposite 
predictions about the role of prior reward expectancy. While the posterior reward 
expectation hypothesis predicts larger value with larger prior reward expectancy, our data 
show larger value with smaller prior expectancy, consistent with the prediction error 
hypothesis presented here (see also Rigoli et al., 2016a; 2016b). 
With reference to the three levels of analysis (i.e., computational, algorithmic and 
implementation) proposed by Marr (1982), BCV speaks to the computational level as it 
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focuses on normative principles (implicit in optimal Bayesian inference) proposed to explain 
value and choice adaptation. In addition, BCV also has implications for the other levels and 
there are now several biologically-plausible accounts of how Bayesian inference might be  
implemented in the brain (e.g., Doya et al., 2007; Friston, 2005; Hennequin et al., 2014; Knill 
& Pouget, 2004), where some accounts consider neuronal circuits (and generative models) 
characterized by a hierarchical organization (e.g., Friston, 2005). BCV fits comfortably within 
these biologically-plausible accounts. Consistent with BCV are findings that several brain 
regions show a response to reward that adapts to both expected reward (e.g., in signalling 
reward prediction error) and reward range (Bermudez & Schultz, 2010; Cox & Kable, 2014; 
Louie et al., 2011; Padoa-Schioppa, 2009; Padoa-Schioppa & Assad, 2008; Park et al., 2012; 
Rigoli et al., 2016a; Tobler et al., 2005 Kobayashi et al., 2010; Tremblay & Schultz, 1999). 
Recent evidence for an association between neural and choice adaptation is also in line with 
BCV (Rigoli et al., 2016a). However, key neurobiological predictions of BCV, including the 
specific neural mechanisms that realize choice adaptation as well as the implementation of 
hierarchical generative models of reward, await further investigation (Diuk et al., 2013). 
Theoretical work has indicated that adaptation of neuronal responses is consistent with 
efficient coding, whereby the signalling of a finite pool of neurons – with a finite dynamic 
range of responses – can be optimally tuned to the statistics of stimuli in the environment, 
so to maximize discriminability among the stimuli (Carandini & Heeger, 2012; Louie et al., 
2015; Rangel & Clithero, 2012; Summerfield & Tsetsos, 2015.) This idea has now been 
extended to reward processing. Here proposals diverge as to the prediction whether 
adaptive neuronal coding determines either stability or adaptation in choice behaviour 
(Louie et al., 2015; Padoa-Schioppa & Rustichini, 2014; Rangel & Clithero, 2012; 
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Summerfield & Tsetsos, 2015). In addressing this, BCV (similar to other Bayesian inference 
schemes for continuous variables) implements adaptive coding, because precision-weighted 
prediction error postulated to be signalled by value-processing neurons is a normalized 
quantity (Doya et al., 2007). Also in line with previous accounts (Louie et al., 2015; Rangel & 
Clithero, 2012; Summerfield & Tsetsos, 2015), BCV proposes that this normalized signal 
corresponds to incentive value, and that adaptive coding in the brain should be reflected in 
a behavioural choice adaptation. In other words, BCV implies that, as well as neural 
signalling, behaviour itself is tuned to the statistics of the incentives, so as to maximize 
discriminability among these incentives. 
We highlight shortcomings of the model, though the framework itself may be fruitful in 
addressing some of these shortcomings. First, our focus is on scenarios where incentive 
value depends on contextual information (either represented by cues or by previous 
rewards) provided before reward delivery. Another form of context effect on incentive value 
is induced by options that are simultaneously available (Louie et al., 2013; 2015). Further 
theoretical work is needed to link BCV and this form of influence, though a sequential 
inferential process (e.g. Bayesian belief updating), similar to the process described here 
(possibly linked to attention) might be involved in simultaneous contextual effects. Second, 
our focus has been on conditions where reward is defined by a single attribute (e.g., reward 
amount). Contextual influences (e.g., the decoy effect) can emerge when multiple 
dimensions need to be evaluated and integrated, as investigated by multi-attribute theories 
(Bhargava, & Fisman, 2914; Huber et al., 1982; Johnson & Busemeyer, 2005; Roe et al., 
2011; Simonson & Tversky, 1992; Soltani et al., 2012; Tsetsos et al., 2010; 2012; 2016; 
Tversky, 1972; Usher & McClelland, 2004). BCV can in principle be extended to these 
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scenarios, for instance connecting to a body of work on multisensory integration using 
Bayesian principles (Ernst, 2006). This would provide an opportunity to model attentional 
processes determining an optimal weighting of different attributes based on their 
importance and reliability. Third, our current formulation assumes that model parameters 
are given, while these parameters need to be learned in the first place. Questions about the 
mechanisms that might underpin learning of generative models adopted for Bayesian 
inference are still largely open, though substantial contributions exist particularly in the 
context of structure learning (Acuna & Schrater, 2009; Behrens et al., 2007; Collins & Frank, 
2013;  Courville et al., 2006; FitzGerald et al., 2014; Gershman & Niv, 2010; Mathys et al., 
2011).  
Here, we have assumed that variables of the generative model are Gaussian. This allows us 
to present the model in a simple and clear way, as posterior beliefs can be inferred 
analytically with relatively simple equations as adopted in standard decision-making 
schemes (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). Though Gaussian assumptions are probably an over-
simplification, with appropriate adjustments BCV can be extended to generative models 
with non-Gaussian variables (Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010). Indeed, the arguments behind BCV 
can be applied to any variables with an exponential distribution. However, the key idea 
(tested in our experiments – and here derived from Gaussian assumptions) that reward 
average and variance elicit subtractive and divisive normalization, respectively, is quite 
general and can also be applied, for instance, to uniform (and, in general, non-skewed) 
distributions. 
Finally, there are questions related to psychopathology that can be fruitfully formulated in 
terms of BCV, for example addiction. Consider the consequences of drug misuse, including 
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the development of tolerance (i.e., the need of increased dosages to obtain the same 
effects as those obtained previously) and the lack of satisfaction when engaging in activities 
that were pleasurable before the development of addiction. BCV interprets these effects in 
terms of increases in expected reward (following drug misuse) that decreases the incentive 
value of rewards, including the drug itself and other motivational stimuli. A similar 
explanation has been proposed by classical homeostatic theories, where ingestion of the 
drug is conceived in terms of a means to re-establish a biological set point (e.g., expressed in 
baseline activity of dopamine neurons), coupled with the fact that repeated drug misuse 
raises this set point. BCV formalise and extend the set-point model. First, it relaxes the 
homeostatic assumption because incentive value depends on a reference point (i.e., the 
reward average), but does not correspond to distance from a set point as in homeostatic 
schemes. Indeed, set-point models predict that drug consumption always reduces a 
negative affect state by re-establishing a set point. Conversely, BCV suggests that drug 
consumption can decrease a negative state (when the drug-associated outcome is worse 
than expected) but also induce a positive affect (when the drug-associated outcome is 
better than expected), a prediction more consistent with empirical evidence (Robinson & 
Berridge, 2000). Second, leveraging on a Bayesian framework, BCV assigns a crucial role to 
reward uncertainty, above and beyond a role assigned to expected reward. For instance, 
increased uncertainty over prior reward beliefs may boost the magnitude of the (positive) 
prediction error elicited by drug consumption, hence enhancing individual predisposition to 
drug addiction. 
In summary, we introduce a normative Bayesian model to explain the influence of contexts 
on incentive values. Key features of this account include an explicit generative model of 
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reward and the assumption that incentive value corresponds to precision-weighted 
prediction error. This formulation implies that incentive value is intrinsically context-
dependent. We tested key predictions of the model in two human experiments and show  
choice behaviour consistent with an adapting incentive value based on reward variance and 
on an average reward expected after integrating contexts at two hierarchical levels, one 
more general and the other more specific. An important consideration is that expressions of 
context effect, though apparently irrational, can derive from Bayes (optimal) inference. 
Indeed, if incentive values are (precision-weighted) prediction errors, they are necessarily 
context-dependent, and this dependency can be described under a Bayes optimal scheme. 
We argue that this approach could be useful in generating new empirical predictions and in 
explaining phenomena in psychopathologies characterized by dysfunctional value 
attribution, such as addiction. 
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Participants 
36 healthy right-handed adults (19 females; 20-40 age range; mean age 26) participated in 
experiment one, and 32 healthy right-handed adults (18 females, aged 20-40, mean age 27) 
participated in experiment two. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
None had history of head injury, a diagnosis of any neurological or psychiatric condition, or 
was currently on medication affecting the central nervous system. The first experiment was 
conducted at the Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging at the University College London 
and was approved by the University College of London Research Ethics Committee. The 
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second experiment was conducted at the Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology & Neuroscience 
at the King’s College of London and was approved by the King’s College of London Research 
Ethics Committee. All participants provided written informed consent and were paid for 
participating. 
 
Experimental paradigm and procedure 
Experiment one. Participants performed a computer-based decision-making task lasting 
approximately 30 minutes (Figure 2). A monetary amount (referred as trial amount), 
changing trial by trial, was presented in the centre of the screen and participants had to 
choose whether to accept half of it for sure (pressing a left button) or select a gamble 
(pressing a right button). The outcomes of this choice were either zero or the full monetary 
amount, each with equal probability, ensuring the sure option and gamble always had the 
same EV. The task was organized in blocks, each associated with one of two contexts which 
determined the possible EVs associated with the block. These EVs were £3 and £4 for the 
low-variance context, and £2, £3, £4 and £5 for the high-variance context. Note that average 
choice EV was equal across contexts (i.e., £3.5). Contexts were cued by the associated EVs 
displayed on the top of the screen in brackets. Before a new block started, the statement 
“New set” appeared for two seconds, followed by the contextual cue for two seconds. Next, 
the trial amount of the first trial was displayed followed, after the subject made a choice, by 
the outcome shown for one second. The possible contextual cue remained on the screen 
during an inter trial interval that lasted one and a half seconds. Participants had three 
seconds to make their choices; otherwise the statement “too late” appeared and they 
received a zero outcome amount. 
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Eight blocks were presented, alternating between a low and high-variance context with the 
order counterbalanced across subjects. The former blocks comprised 40 trials each and the 
latter blocks comprised 80 trials, in such a way that the EVs common to both contexts (i.e., 
£3 and £4) were shown an equal amount of time in the two contexts. The order of trial 
amounts and outcomes were pseudo-randomized. At the end of the experiment, one 
outcome was randomly selected among those received and added to an initial participation 
payment of £5. Before the task, participants were fully instructed both on task 
contingencies and payment rules. 
Experiment two. Participants played a computer-based task lasting approximately 40 
minutes. On each of the 480 trials, two rectangles representing two decks of cards 
appeared, one on the top and the other on the bottom of the screen. Each card was 
associated with a monetary amount, and the average amount of each deck was displayed in 
brackets upon the deck. The decks were coloured: one in gray and the other in blue and 
were shown for 1.5 seconds. On each trial a card was pseudo-randomly drawn from the blue 
deck and the corresponding monetary amount was presented in the middle of the screen. 
Participants had to choose between half of the monetary amount for sure (pressing a right 
button) and a gamble between the full amount and a zero outcome (pressing a left button), 
each with 50% chance. After choosing, the outcome appeared for one second and a new 
trial started immediately. If no response occurred before three seconds, a statement “too 
late” was presented for one second, resulting in a zero outcome. 
Among the two decks shown on the screen, the selected deck (coloured in blue) alternated 
pseudo-randomly over blocks (each including 5 trials). In addition, at some points during the 
task, decks were replaced by new decks. Two sets of decks alternated over blocks of 20 
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trials in a pseudo-random way. The first deck-set (low-value deck-set) comprised decks 
returning £5 and £7 on average, the second deck-set (high-value deck-set) comprised decks 
returning £7 and £9 on average. The cards of the £5 deck could be associated with £3, £5 
and £7; the cards of the £7 deck could be associated with £5, £7 and £9; the cards of the £9 
deck could be associated with £7, £9 and £11. When a new deck was selected (i.e., it was 
coloured in blue), decks were shown for 2.5s before the card amount appeared; when a new 
deck-set appeared, decks were shown for 4.5s before the card amount appeared. At the end 
of the experiment, one of the outcomes was randomly selected by the computer, added to 
an initial payment of £5 and the total amount was paid to participants. The participants 
were fully instructed about task rules and about the way payment was carried out prior to 
task performance. 
 
Behavioural modelling 
The free parameters of the models were estimated separately for each subject using 
fminsearchbnd function of the Optimization toolbox in Matlab. Parameters were 
constrained within the following ranges: -5 and 5 for α (in both experiments), -10 and 10 for 
ρ (in both experiments), 0.1 and 10 for τ (in experiment one), -1 and 1 for  and  (in 
experiment two). In addition, to minimize the effect of biased outlier estimates, Gaussian 
priors with mean zero (Daw, 2011) were used for estimation of log(τ) (in experiment one) 
and estimation of  and  (in experiment two). Starting values for parameter estimation 
was zero for all parameters, except for the context parameter τ in experiment one for which 
it was one. Distributions of estimated parameters are reported in Figure 4 – figure 
supplements 1 (experiment one) and Figure 7 – figure supplements 1 (experiment two), and 
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show no evidence of outliers (i.e., scores larger or smaller than 3 SD compared to the mean) 
for any of the parameters.  
For each model, the log-likelihood of the choice data given the best fitting parameters 
(estimated with the method described above) was computed subject by subject and 
summed across subjects. We compared the full model with nested models, namely where 
one or more parameters were fixed to zero. To do this, we used the standard approach of 
the likelihood-ratio test (Casella & Berger, 2002; Daw, 2011), which allows for a comparison 
of nested models. This is based on the fact that the difference in negative log-likelihood 
times two (2d) between a nested and a more complex model follows a chi-square 
distribution, where the number of degrees of freedom is equal to the number of additional 
parameters of the more complex model. A chi-square test can be performed to estimate the 
probability that the observed 2d is due to chance under the null hypothesis that data are 
generated by the nested model, allowing acceptance or rejection of the null hypothesis. 
 
APPENDIX 
We derive equation 7 from the generative model shown in Figure 1C. A higher-level 
contextual variable (e.g., the neighbourhood) is represented by a Gaussian distribution with 
mean  equal to zero and variance , from which a value HC is sampled. Sensory 
evidence about HC is provided and represented by HO which is sampled from a Gaussian 
distribution with mean HC and variance . A lower-level contextual variable (e.g., the 
restaurant) is represented by a (Gaussian) distribution with mean HC and variance , from 
which a value LC is sampled. Sensory evidence about LC is provided and represented by LO 
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which is sampled from a Gaussian distribution with mean LC and variance  A reward is 
obtained and sampled from a Gaussian distribution with mean LC and variance . We 
propose that agents infer the posterior distribution P(LC|HO,LO,R)  sequentially by 
estimating, in the order, P(HC|HO), P(LC|HO), P(LC|HO,LO), and P(LC|HO,LO,R). The 
posterior mean of P(HC|HO) is: 
 
 
 
(12) 
And the posterior variance: 
 
 
 
(13) 
The posterior mean of P(LC|HO) is equal to  ( ), while the posterior 
variance is: 
  
 
(14) 
The posterior mean of P(LC|HO,PO) is: 
 
 
 
(15) 
And the posterior variance: 
 
 
(16) 
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Finally, the posterior mean of P(LC|HO,LO,R) is: 
 
 
 
(17) 
 
Implying (with few algebraic transformations) the following incentive value for the reward: 
 
 
 
(18) 
This equation implements three normalization factors: (i) a subtractive normalization factor 
 proportional to the value LO observed at the low contextual level, (ii) a 
subtractive normalization factor  proportional to the value HO 
observed at the high contextual level, (iii) a divisive normalization factor  that 
captures the weighting dependent on the (relative) reward variance. If we define the three 
factors as  and  and K respectively, we obtain equation 7. 
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Figure captions 
Figure 1. Generative models of reward: these generative models are depicted as directed 
acyclic graphs or Bayesian networks. Circles represent random variables (shaded and white 
circles refer to observed and non-observed variables respectively). An arrow denotes a 
conditional dependence – in which one random variable supplies a sufficient statistic of the 
probability distribution of its children. In BCV, contextual variables generate the sufficient 
statistics (expectation and variance) of a Gaussian observable variable corresponding to 
reward. In these examples, the contextual variables generate first-order sufficient statistics 
of their descendants (e.g., the mean of Gaussian distributions) as in parametric or empirical 
Bayesian models. Alternatively, the contextual variables could determine the variance of 
Gaussian random variables; in which case this would be a hierarchical Gaussian filter.  
Inverting this model, given observations, furnishes posterior beliefs over the context 
variables. This inference determines incentive value which is conceived as precision-
weighted prediction error. A: Generative model where a contextual variable C reflects a 
prior belief over the reward mean. B: Generative model where a contextual variable C 
generates a prior expectancy of zero over the reward mean, and a noisy observation O of 
the context is provided. C: Generative model where context is organized hierarchically and 
comprises a high level (HC; e.g., a neighbourhood) and a low level (LC; e.g., a restaurant), 
both associated with noisy observations (HO and LO respectively).  
 
Figure 2. Effects predicted by BCV on incentive value (V(R)) as a function of reward (R) and 
contexts associated with specific distributions of rewards presented sequentially over trials 
arranged in blocks. A: Example with a single hierarchical level where two contexts have 
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different average reward. In blocks associated with a low-average context (LA; in lighter 
grey), possible rewards are x, x+1 and x+2; in blocks associated with a high-average context 
(HA; in darker grey), possible rewards are x, x+1 and x+2. B: BCV prediction of the incentive 
value attributed to rewards depending on these contexts. Larger values are predicted in the 
LA compared to the HA for amounts common to both contexts. C: Effects predicted by BCV 
dependent on contexts with different reward variance. In blocks associated with a high-
variance context (HV; in white), possible rewards are x, x+1 x+2 and x+3; in blocks associated 
with a low-variance context (LV; in grey), possible rewards are x+1 and x+2. F: BCV 
prediction of the incentive value attributed to rewards depending on these contexts. 
Considering rewards common to both contexts, BCV predicts higher incentive value for x+1 
in the high-variance context and for x+2 in the low-variance context. C: Example with two 
hierarchical levels (low-level (LL) contexts, represented by patterns of bars, and high-level 
(HL) contexts, represented by frames). Blocks associated with HL contexts comprise several 
sub-blocks associated with LL contexts having specific average reward. In the HL context 
with low-value (HL-LA; light frame), a LL context with low value (LL-LA, where rewards are x, 
x+1 and x+2) and a LL context with medium value (LL-MA, where rewards are x+1, x+2 and 
x+3) alternate. In the HL context with high-value (HL-HA; dark frame), a LL-MA context and a 
LL context with high value (LL-HA, where rewards are x+2, x+3 and x+4) alternate. D: BCV 
prediction of the incentive value attributed to rewards depending on these contexts. The 
pattern of bars represent the LL context condition, the outline colour represent the HL 
context condition. BCV predicts that incentive values derive from integrating both 
hierarchical levels, with larger values emerging when average reward is lower at both 
context levels. 
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Figure 3. Behavioural paradigm. On each trial, participants were presented a monetary 
amount (£8 in this example) in the middle of the screen and had to choose between half of 
the amount for sure (pressing a left button) and a gamble (pressing a right button) 
associated with either the full amount or a zero outcome, each with equal chance. The 
outcome was shown right after response for one second. During the intertrial interval (ITI), 
the possible amounts of the next trial were shown on the top of the screen in brackets. The 
same amounts were presented throughout blocks associated either with a low-variance (LV) 
context, including £6 and £8 amounts, or a high-variance (HV) context, including £4, £6, £8 
and £10 amounts. 
 
Figure 4. Results of experiment one (data used for the analyses reported here are provided 
in Source code 1). A: Gambling proportion for different EVs and contexts for participants 
who gambled more for £4 compared to £3 choices. B: Gambling proportion for different EVs 
and context for participants who gambled less for £4 compared to £3 choices. C: 
Relationship between average gambling proportion for £3 and £4 EV choices and gambling 
proportion for £4 minus £3 choices. Data showed no correlation (r(36) = -0.06, p = 0.75). D: 
The same relationship is reported for data simulated with the computational model of 
choice behaviour and the parameters estimated from choice behaviour (r(36) = -0.03, p 
=0.87). E: Relationship between (i) the gambling proportion for £4 minus £3 choices and (ii) 
the interaction term reflecting the gambling proportion for £4 minus £3 choices in the low-
variance context compared to the gambling proportion for £4 minus £3 choices in the high-
variance context. Data showed a positive correlation (r(36) =  0.45, p = 0.005). Note that this 
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result remains significant also using Spearman correlation, which is less affected by outliers 
(rho = 0.51, p = 0.002). F: The same relationship is reported for data simulated with the 
computational model of choice behaviour and the parameters estimated from choice 
behaviour (r(36) = 0.48, p = 0.003; the plot reports an example taken from the 100 
simulations). 
Figure supplements 1: Experiment one: distribution of parameters estimated from choice 
data with the full model. 
 
Figure 5. Experimental paradigm: participants played a computer-based task where, on each 
trial, two rectangles representing two decks of cards appeared. Each card was associated 
with a monetary gain, and the average monetary gain of each deck was displayed in 
brackets on the deck. The decks were coloured one in blue and the other in grey, indicating 
the selected and unselected deck respectively. Among these two decks shown on the 
screen, the selected deck (coloured in blue) alternated pseudo-randomly over blocks (each 
including 5 trials). In addition, two sets of decks alternated over longer blocks (20 trials) in a 
pseudo-random way. After decks were shown during an inter-trial-interval of 1.5s, a card 
was pseudo-randomly drawn from the blue deck and the corresponding monetary amount 
was presented in the middle of the screen. Participants had to choose between half of the 
monetary amount for sure (pressing a left button) and a gamble between the full amount 
and a zero outcome (pressing a right button), each with 50% chance. After choosing, the 
choice outcome appeared for one second. At the end of the experiment, one outcome was 
randomly selected and paid to participants. B: Schematic of how contexts are organized in 
this paradigm. The selected deck alternated pseudo-randomly over blocks. In addition, two 
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sets of decks alternated over longer blocks in a pseudo-random way. The low-value deck-set 
(LV Deck-set; light grey frame) comprised decks associated with £5 and £7 on average; the 
high-value deck-set (HV Deck-set; dark grey frame) comprised decks associated with £7 and 
£9 on average. The cards of the £5 deck could be associated with £3, £5 and £7; the cards of 
the £7 deck could be associated with £5, £7 and £9; the cards of the £9 deck could be 
associated with £7, £9 and £11.  
 
Figure 6. Gambling proportion for different card amounts and different context conditions 
(data used for this figure are provided in Source code 2), separately for (A) participants 
showing a negative effect of card monetary amount (i.e., the slope of the logistic regression 
model with card amount as predictor) on gambling (n=19) and (B) participants showing a 
positive effect of card amount on gambling (n=13). When considering amounts that are 
common to multiple contexts, these data show that (i) for the first group of participants, 
gambling decreases as the context condition is characterized by lower expectations (after 
integrating both contexts) and (ii) for the second group of participants, gambling increases 
when the context is characterized by lower expectations, after integrating both contexts 
(except for the £9 amount). These data are consistent with our hypotheses; namely (i) with 
predictions arising from BCV (Figure 2D) which implies subtractive normalization of 
incentive value at both hierarchical levels and (ii) with the prediction (derived from previous 
observations; Rigoli et al., 2016a; 2016b) that the influence of incentive value on gambling 
proportion depends on the individual preference to gamble with large or small card 
amounts. 
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Figure 7. Results of experiment two (data used for the analyses reported here are provided 
in Source code 2). A: Relationship between the individual gambling percentage and the 
effect of monetary amount on gambling proportion (i.e., the associated regression 
coefficient of the logistic regression model; r(32) = 0.23, p = 0.21, non-significant). B: The 
same relationship is reported for data simulated with the computational model of choice 
behaviour and the parameters estimated from choice behaviour (r(32) = 0.06, p =0.76, non-
significant; the plot reports an example taken from the 100 simulations). C: We computed 
for each deck-set the difference in gambling between lower and higher value decks for 
amounts common to both decks; corresponding to £5 and £7 in the low-value deck-set, and 
to £7 and £9 in the high-value deck-set. The relationship between the mean of these two 
differences and the effect of card amount on gambling is reported (r(32) = 0.55, p = 0.001). 
D: The same relationship is reported for data simulated with the computational model of 
choice behaviour and the parameters estimated from choice behaviour (r(32) = 0.58, p < 
0.001; the plot reports an example taken from the 100 simulations). E: Relationship 
between the difference in gambling between the low and high value deck-set for the £7 
deck (common to both deck-sets) and the effect of card amount on gambling (r(32) = 0.42, p 
= 0.018). F: The same relationship is reported for data simulated with the computational 
model of choice behaviour and the parameters estimated from choice behaviour 
(r(32)=0.57, p = 0.03; the plot reports an example taken from the 100 simulations).  
Figure supplements 1: Experiment two: distribution of parameters estimated from choice 
data with the full model. 
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Source code 1: Gambling proportion for the different conditions of experiment one. Rows 
indicate participants and columns indicate conditions (from left to right: £2, £3, £4, £5 EV in 
the high-variance context, and £3 and £4 EV in the low variance context). 
Source code 2: Data from experiment two. Rows indicate participants and columns indicate 
data. The first twelve columns report the gambling proportion for the different conditions 
(from left to right: HV-deck-set, £9 deck, £11 card; HV-deck-set, £9 deck, £9 card; HV-deck-
set, £9 deck, £7 card; HV-deck-set, £7 deck, £9 card; HV-deck-set, £7 deck, £7 card; HV-deck-
set, £7 deck, £5 card; LV-deck-set, £7 deck, £9 card; LV-deck-set, £7 deck, £7 card; LV-deck-
set, £7 deck, £5 card; LV-deck-set, £5 deck, £7 card; LV-deck-set, £5 deck, £5 card; LV-deck-
set, £5 deck, £3 card). Columns 13 and 14 report the average gambling proportion and the 
effect of card amount on gambling probability (i.e., i.e., the associated regression coefficient 
of the logistic regression model), respectively. For each deck-set, the difference in gambling 
between lower and higher value decks for amounts common to both decks (corresponding 
to £5 and £7 in the low-value deck-set, and to £7 and £9 in the high-value deck-set) was 
computed and the mean of these two differences is reported in column 15. Column 16 
reports the difference in gambling between the low and high value deck-set for the £7 deck 
(common to both deck-sets). 
 
 
 
 







